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Peace Through Trade?
Developments in Palestinian Trade Law
During the Peace Process
DAvID P. FIDLER*
INTRODUCnION
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has many complicated and
controversial features, but perhaps none so complex and politi-
cally charged as the strategy for Palestinian economic develop-
ment. The leaders who gave the peace process life believed that its
success depended on the economic development of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (the "Palestinian Territories" or "Territories").'
The Palestinian economic development strategy involves a number
of important elements,2 but central to the entire strategy is the
objective of creating conditions that allow Palestinians to engage
in regional and global trade. Three years after the Rabin-Arafat
handshake that objective remains illusive. Suicide bombings un-
dertaken by the radical Palestinian group Hamas in Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem in March, July, and September 1997 have sent the peace
process into its darkest moments, prompting the direct interven-
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington;
M.hil., University of Oxford; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.CL, University of Oxford. I
would like to thank Peter Daniel DiPaola and Erich J. Schwerd for their help in preparing
this article. I also thank Raj K. Bhala for his comments on an earlier draft I would also
like to thank Joe DeSutter and Sandra Yamin, formerly of Builders for Peace, for encour-
aging my work on Palestinian economic development. An earlier version of this Article
was published in Hebrew in a special volume of the Bar-Ilan University Law Review in
Israel dedicated to the memory of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin.
1. Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving Political Stability and
Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1419,1420
(1996) (noting that "real economic growth that is rapid, profound, and sustained" was a
major criterion for successful implementation of Palestinian autonomy).
2- See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tion of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The recent
and deepest crisis in the peace process has also adversely affected
economic development in the Palestinian Territories.
This Article examines the development of Palestinian trade law
during the peace process and identifies the major obstacles to the
creation of significant trade opportunities for the Palestinian peo-
ple. Underlying my analysis is a fundamental tension in the peace
process: without peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Pales-
tinian trade will not develop adequately, but without adequate
trade, Palestinian faith in the peace process will be eroded by the
lack of economic opportunity. I propose an alternative way to
structure the trade arrangement between Israel and the Palestini-
ans that might offer a way to overcome the "no peace, no trade-
no trade, no peace" dilemma that currently haunts the peace pro-
cess.
I. THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE
A. The Economic Development Strategy
The leaders who crafted the peace process believed "that Pales-
tinians who see no improvement in their standard of living or find
no economic opportunities as a result of the peace process will
question the wisdom of making deals with Israel and perhaps sup-
port forces that oppose the peace process."3 Odin Knudsen, the
World Bank's former Resident Representative in its West Bank
and Gaza Resident Mission, stressed the importance of Palestinian
economic development to the peace process by arguing that, with-
out an economically viable Palestinian entity, "the Palestinians will
become more impoverished, breeding more resentment and hos-
tility towards Israel."4 This perspective explains why experts ana-
lyzing the current state of the Palestinian economy are worried
about the prospects for the peace process.
The economic development strategy created for the Palestinian
Territories contained four fundamental elements. First, Israel and
other developed countries would provide substantial aid to help
3. David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on
the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'LL. J. 529,531 (1995).
4. Odin K. Knudsen, Beyond the Israeli Election: Bringing Forth a Sustainable Pales-
tinian Economy, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PULSE 21 (May-June 1996).
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the Palestinians build a modem economic infrastructure. 5 Second,
Israel and the Palestinian Territories would continue to have close
economic relations to maintain continuity with the economic dy-
namics built up during the Israeli occupation. Third, the improved
Palestinian economic infrastructure combined with potential mar-
ket opportunities in Israel and the region would attract significant
amounts of foreign private investment. Although the World Bank
believed that aid would be needed, it recognized that the private
sector, stimulated by foreign investment, would have to be the real
engine of Palestinian economic development.' Fourth, the private
sector in the Palestinian Territories would need access to foreign
markets in addition to those in Israel. Trade with other regional
economies and with more distant markets was, thus, integral to the
success of the Palestinian private sector and to attracting foreign
investment.7 Creating opportunities for Palestinians to trade re-
gionally and globally became a central feature of the Palestinian
economic development strategy.
B. Challenges to the Economic Development Strategy
The obstacles to the creation of regional and global trade oppor-
tunities for Palestinians have been considerable. In 1993, the
World Bank concluded that economic patterns in the Palestinian
Territories since 1967 were conditioned by, among other things,
5. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1
DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE, Overview 9
(1993) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, Overview] (identifying serious infrastructure problems
in the West Bank and Gaza economies). The peace process has witnessed many problems
with the flow of international aid from donor countries to the Palestinian Authority, which
are beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detaiL For an overview of the aid pro-
gram to the Palestinian Authority, see Palestinian Dev. InfoNet, Development Assistance
to the West Bank and Gaza: An Overview (last modified March, 1997)
<http.lwww.arts.mcgil.calMEPP/PDIN/pdoverview.html>.
6. WORLD BANK, Overview, supra note 5, at 13, 15. As with the international aid pro-
gram, the objective of increasing foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories has en-
countered many problems. For a detailed overview of the obstacles confronting this ob-
jective, see Fidler, supra note 3. The World Bank reported that private investment in the
Palestinian economy fell "from $750 million (or 26 percent of GDP) in 1993, to $435 mil-
lion (13 percent of GDP) in 1995." World Bank, The West Bank and Gaza: Country
Overview (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <httpJ/www.worldbank.orgihtmllextdrloffreplmenal
wb&g.htm>. Approximately 90% of this investment was domestic rather than foreign. ld
7. The World Bank noted that anticipated access to markets in Israel, the rest of the
Middle East, and Europe helped "give West Bank and Gaza appreciable economic poten-
tial." World Bank, The West Bank and Gaza: Country Overview, supra note 6.
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"asymmetric trade relations" with Israel and the rest of the world.8
During the Israeli occupation, Palestinians conducted trade mainly
with or through Israel both with respect to exports and imports.9
In the mid-1980's, the Palestinian Territories purchased 90% of
their imports from Israel and sold 75% of their exports to Israel.10
Palestinian trade dependence on Israel did not result from Pales-
tinian enterprises acting upon the principle of comparative advan-
tage but from Israel's military occupation and political control
over the Palestinian Territories.1 Israeli goods flowed freely into
the West Bank and Gaza, but Palestinian goods that competed
with Israeli products were either banned or heavily limited from
entering Israel. 2 Commentators also noted the "devastating ef-
fect" the Arab boycott of Israel had on the Palestinian economy
because it cut off exports of goods to the Arab world from Pales-
tinian enterprises. 3
8. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2 DE-
VELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE, The Economy, 45
(1993) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, The Economy]. The argument about the asymmetrical
development of the Palestinian economy since 1967 is not to be confused with a claim that
Israeli occupation produced no economic development. The World Bank reported that
between 1968 and 1980, the Palestinian economy rapidly grew because of many factors,
"including the rapid integration with Israel and the regional economic boom." WORLD
BANK, Overview, supra note 5, at 4. This growth, however, took a certain form that has
produced the structural imbalances now present in the Palestinian economy. For an his-
torical analysis of the economies of the West Bank and Gaza since 1918, see Roger Owen,
Economic Development in Mandatory Palestine: 1918-1948, in THE PALESTINIAN
ECONOMY: STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT UNDER PROLONGED OCCUPATION 13 (George
T. Abed ed., 1988); Antoine Mansour, The West Bank Economy: 1948-1984, in id., at 71;
and Ziad Abu-Amr, The Gaza Economy: 1948-1984, in id., at 101.
9. Samir Hazboun et al., The Economic Impact of the Israeli PLO Declaration of Prin-
ciples on the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Middle East Region, 3 ISRAEL/PALESTINE
ISSUES IN CONFLICT-ISSUES FOR COOPERATION 2, 7 (1994) (noting that "[t]he bulk of
Palestinian goods for the last 26 years has been traded mainly with neighboring Israel and
to a lesser extent Jordan.").
10. WORLD BANK, The Economy, supra note 8, at 45.
11. Hazboun, supra note 9, at 7. The principle of comparative advantage was summa-
rized as follows in a report prepared for the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade:
Trade allows countries to concentrate on what they can do best. No two coun-
tries are exactly alike in natural resources, climate or work force. Those differ-
ences give each country a 'comparative advantage' over the others in some
products. Trade translates the individual advantages of many countries into
maximum productivity for all. This is the classic theory of international trade.
Leutwiler Report, quoted in JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 9 (1989).
12. Hazboun, supra note 9, at 7.
13. Id. at 7-8. For a discussion of the Arab boycott of Israel, see INTERNATIONAL
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION, 3 DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRIrORIES: AN
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The consequences of Palestinian trade dependence on Israel
went beyond export and import statistics because this asymmetri-
cal relationship adversely affected how the Palestinian economy
developed. Two very important adverse consequences were (1)
the low industrialization in the Palestinian Territories produced by
the lack of incentives to expand manufacturing, 14 and (2) the ex-
cessive reliance on the export of labor to the Israeli market.15 The
Israeli occupation left the Palestinian economy distorted in its
economic infrastructure, reliant on the Israeli market for employ-
ment opportunities, and almost totally dependent on Israel for im-
ports and exports.16 Creating more diversified trade opportunities
for Palestinians within the context of a distorted economic struc-
ture would, given the best of conditions, prove immensely chal-
lenging.
The distorted nature of the Palestinian economy created during
the period of occupation underscored how important each of the
elements of the economy development strategy would be." Aid
and foreign private investment would be needed to develop the
economic infrastructure, promote the growth of manufacturing,
and provide employment opportunities for the Palestinian labor
force. Foreign investors would need access to the lucrative Israeli
market as well as opportunities to use the West Bank and Gaza as
export platforms to other regional and world markets. If any of
the elements ran into difficulty in implementation, then the entire
INVESTMENT IN PEACE, Private Sector Development 58-59 (1993) [hereinafter, WORLD
BANK, Private Sector Development].
14. Hazboun, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing impact of trade asymmetry on Palestinian
industrial development). See also GEORGE T. ABED, THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF A
PALESTINA STATE 12 (1990) (arguing that during the occupation "Israel's administra-
tive powers (such as its licensing authority) were used to suppress industrial develop-
ment.").
15. WORLD BANK, The Economy, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that "the West Bank and
Gaza exported labor in the place of goods, partly because of an asymmetric structure of
incentives").
16. The World Bank enumerated the following structural imbalances in the Palestinian
economy in 1993: "(i) heavy dependence on outside sources of employment in the OT
[occupied territories] labor force; (ii) an unusually low degree of industrialization; (iii) a
trade structure heavily dominated by trading links with Israel ... ; and (iv) inadequacies in
the provision of public infrastructure and services." WORLD BANK, Overview, supra note
5, at 5.
17. The World Bank emphasized this point in arguing that in Palestinian economic de-
velopment "[m]uch will also depend upon the quality of economic management in the
post-peace period and the strategic choices made in managing the OT economy." Id. at
13.
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economic development strategy for the Palestinians would be
jeopardized.
II. IMPLEMENTING A PALESTINIAN TRADE STRATEGY THROUGH
THE OSLO ACCORDS
A. The Declaration of Principles
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Ar-
rangements ("Declaration of Principles") 18 signed September 13,
1993 launched the peace process, and it recognized the impor-
tance of Palestinian economic development. 19 Annex III of the
Declaration of Principles commits Israel and the PLO to
"[c]ooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade
Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and in-
ter-regional trade .... 20 Some predicted that the Declaration of
Principles would affect Palestinian trade enormously."' The Dec-
laration of Principles did not, however, establish a blueprint for a
Palestinian trade strategy.22 In fact, the Declaration of Principles
papered over some tensions between the Palestinians and Israel
on the form of the trade regime for the West Bank and Gaza.23
B. The Economic Protocol
The fundamental document providing structure for a Palestinian
trade strategy for the peace process has been the Protocol on Eco-
nomic Relations between Israel and the PLO ("Economic Proto-
18. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration
of Principles].
19. The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., Economic Policy and Economy, Economist
Intelligence Unit Country Reports, Dec. 10, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, Mdeafr Li-
brary, Allmde File (noting that the Declaration's provisions on economic development
and cooperation "indicate recognition by the two sides that the success of their peace deal
depends in large part on bringing about an immediate tangible improvement in living
standards for Palestinians .... ).
20. Declaration of Principles, supra note 18, Annex III.
21. Hazboun, supra note 9, at 8.
22. Id. (noting that, as of December 20, 1993, "Palestinians and Israelis have not agreed
on the mode of trade that will be sanctioned.").
23. Some commentators note a conflict between Israel's desire to maintain a customs
union including Israel and the Palestinian Territories using Israeli customs duties and rules
and the Palestinians' desire to have their own customs policy utilizing minimum tariffs to
drop prices of imported goods in order to increase the average Palestinian's purchasing
power. Id.
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col"),24 which first appeared in the Israel-PLO Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area ("Oslo I")15 and then in revised
form in the Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("Oslo II").? The Economic Pro-
tocol established a free trade area between Israel and the West
Bank and Gaza and a customs union based on Israeli customs
rules and tariffs rates. As traditionally understood, a free trade
area is distinct from a customs union, which is sometimes also
called a common market. While both a free trade area and a cus-
toms union attempt to eliminate duties and other restrictive regu-
lations of commerce among the states involved, the customs union
also involves harmonizing duties and other commercial regulations
of all participating states that are applied against all other coun-
tries.28 In the negotiations on the Economic Protocol, the Pales-
tinians pushed for a free trade arrangement while the Israelis
wanted a customs union because they did not want to recognize
Palestinian borders as would be required by a free trade area.29
The compromise reached in the Economic Protocol "borrows cer-
tain elements of both a common market and a free trade area
agreement."'
The first feature of this compromise is the freedom of move-
ment of goods between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The
Economic Protocol allows Palestinian industrial and agricultural
goods to move freely into the Israeli market.31 The Economic Pro-
tocol contains some exceptions to the free movement of agricul-
tural goods, including the application of veterinary and phytosani-
tary measures and quotas on certain agricultural products that will
be phased out by 1998 The free movement of goods between Is-
24. Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel
and the PLO, Representing the Palestinian People [hereinafter Economic Protocol], in
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995 [hereinafter Oslo II], Annex V.
25. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, May 4,1994, Annex IV, 33 I.L.M. 622,696 (1994) [hereinafter Oslo I.
26. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex V.
27. Ephraim Kleiman, The Economic Provisions of the Agreement Between Israel and
the PLO, 28 ISRAEL L REV. 347, 356, 358-60 (1994) (discussing the free trade area and
customs union).
28 See e.g., definitions of "customs union" and "free-trade area" in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV(8)(a) & (b).
29. Kleiman, supra note 27, at 354-55.
30. Id. at355.
31. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, arts. VIII(l) and IX(l).
32. Id., art. VIII(2)-(10).
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rael and the Palestinian Territories promised to eliminate the dis-
criminatory treatment suffered by Palestinian goods during the pe-
riod of occupation. Palestinian enterprises would finally have sig-
nificant access to the large Israeli market. The free movement of
goods created by the Economic Protocol helped support the stra-
tegic objective of close economic relations between Israel and the
Palestinian Territories.33
The second key feature of the trade provisions of the Economic
Protocol is the establishment of a customs union involving Israel
and the Palestinian Territories. Except in limited circumstances,
the Economic Protocol commits both sides to using Israel's cus-
toms regime for imports.34 Thus, "Palestinian import taxes must
generally be set no lower than the Israeli import taxes on equiva-
lent goods. '35 Diverging from a classic customs union model, the
Economic Protocol allows the Palestinians to establish tariffs in-
dependently in two contexts: (1) specified goods produced in Jor-
dan, Egypt, and certain other (mostly Arab or Islamic) countries
may be imported subject to tariff rates set by the Palestinians up to
"the Palestinian market needs" as determined by the two sides,36
with imports exceeding the agreed amounts subject to prevailing
Israeli tariff rates;37 and (2) specified goods described as "basic
food items and other goods for the Palestinian economic devel-
opment program," may be imported without quantitative restric-
tions at tariff rates set by the Palestinians.3 s
Another key feature of the Oslo Accords affecting Palestinian
trade law is the power granted to the Palestinian Authority to ne-
gotiate agreements with states and international organizations to
expand market access for Palestinian exports.39 Utilizing this
power would help the Palestinian Authority fulfill the strategic
economic development need for greater access to regional and
global markets, which in turn would also help attract foreign inves-
33. See Fidler, supra note 3, at 537 (noting that "[t]he Economic Protocol enshrines a
strategy of close economic contact and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian
Territories.").
34. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. III(1).
35. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1447.
36. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. 111(2). Such goods are found in Lists Al and
A2 in Appendix I of the Economic Protocol. Id.
37. Id., art. III(10).
38. Id, art. 111(4). Such goods are contained in List B in Appendix III of the Economic
Protocol. Id.
39. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. IX(5)(b).
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tors who might be interested in the Palestinian Territories as an
export platform.
In sum, the Oslo Accords established the framework for Pales-
tinian trade during the interim period pending the final status ne-
gotiations. This framework has three major features: (1) free
movement of goods between Israel and the Palestinian Territories;
(2) the modified customs union between Israel and the Palestinian
Territories; and (3) the authority of the Palestinian Authority to
open export markets for Palestinian goods.
I. IMPLEMENTING THE OSLO FRAMEWORK FOR PALESINIAN
TRADE
In theory, the Oslo framework for Palestinian trade directly
supported three of the four elements of the Palestinian economic
development strategy. It provided the Palestinians with free ac-
cess to the Israeli market, allowed the Palestinians to promote
their exports regionally and globally, and established a trade situa-
tion that would help attract foreign investment because of access
to Israel and potentially preferential treatment of Palestinian
goods in other lucrative markets. The Oslo trade framework also
indirectly supported the foreign aid component of the develop-
ment strategy by creating an environment where private sector
forces could effectively feed off the infrastructure developments
made through aid.
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Oslo trade framework
has not lived up to expectations. This section of the Article ana-
lyzes how the Oslo trade framework has broken down, contribut-
ing to the deterioration of the Palestinian economy and the ero-
sion of the peace process.
A. Free Movement of Goods
The free movement of goods between Israel and the Palestinian
Territories has never materialized largely because of Israel's secu-
rity concerns. In response to Palestinian terrorist acts inside its
territory and other perceived security threats, Israel has frequently
closed its borders with the Palestinian Territories. These closures
have wreaked havoc on the Palestinian economy. In the most re-
cently available Quarterly Report on Economic and Social Condi-
tions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Office of the United
1998]
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Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories
("UNSCO") reported that Palestinian real gross national product
("GNP") "has declined by 18.4 per cent between end-1992 and
end-1996," which "is mainly attributable to the loss of employment
in Israel and the decline in trade flows due to the Israeli closure
policy." 4  UNSCO also reports that the Israeli closure policy,
combined with significant population growth, has caused real per
capita GNP to fall 36.1 per cent between 1992 and 1996.41 In addi-
tion, UNSCO calculates that closures have cost the Palestinian
economy approximately $6.5 billion for the 1993-1996 period, or a
$4.4 million loss per day.42 Regarding Palestinian trade, the World
Bank reported that:
Repeated border closures and stringent inspection rou-
tines added to the costs of Palestinian exports and un-
dermined delivery schedules; as a result, merchandise ex-
ports fell by almost a half from 11 to 6 percent of GDP
between 1992 and 1995. Imports also suffered, slipping
from 46 percent of GDP in 1992 to 38 percent of GDP in
1995.43
While the World Bank detected some encouraging trends in the
Palestinian economy in early 1997, as Palestinian unemployment
decreased and trade flows increased, it noted that the Israeli bor-
der closures after the March 21, 1997 terrorist attack in Tel Aviv
reversed both these positive trends.'
Palestinian access not only to the Israeli market but also to for-
eign markets has been severely disrupted by the border closings.
The border closures have even prevented Palestinians from con-
ducting normal commerce between the West Bank and Gaza be-
cause safe passage through Israel between the two territories has
been disrupted.45 The impact of the border closings on Palestinian
40. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories,
Quarterly Report on Economic and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(Summary) (April 1997) <http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/unsco/qr2/qr2ex.html>
[hereinafter UNSCO Quarterly Report, April 1997].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. World Bank, The West Bank and Gaza: Country Overview, supra note 6.
44. World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update (Jan.-Mar., 1997)
<http:llwww.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPPIPDIN/docslwbupd397.html>.
45. Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress under the Oslo Agreements, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1393, 1406 (1996) (commenting on "the absence of safe passage be-
tween Gaza and the West Bank, which restricts even non-export oriented Palestinian pro-
ducers to a fraction of their potential markets").
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trade might be alleviated somewhat if Palestinians had their own
international port rather than having to ship everything through
Israeli points of entry and exit.4 Palestinian vulnerability to Is-
raeli security actions will likely remain significant until the opening
of the proposed airport and seaport in Gaza, scheduled for 1998.1
The security-motivated border closings have also adversely af-
fected Palestinian labor exports as Israel restricted the entry of
Palestinian workers.48 The entry restrictions, moreover, form part
of a broader Israeli government strategy to reduce systematically
the role of Palestinian workers in the Israeli economy as part of
the search for security.49 Reducing labor exports produces lower
incomes in the Palestinian Territories, which has an adverse effect
on consumption and savings." While the Economic Protocol did
not guarantee the freedom of movement of labor between Israel
and the Palestinian Territories,51 the economic effects of the bor-
der closures on earnings in the Territories have been painful.
Likewise, the Palestinian terrorist acts in Israel have interfered
with the free movement of goods and have undermined much of
the economic development strategy for the Palestinian Territories.
Access to the Israeli market and other regional and global markets
has been frustrated. Foreign investors have been deterred by the
disruption of trade caused by the border closures.1s Combined
46. Keith Molkner, The First Trilateral Conference for Facilitating Trade and Investment
Flows Between Israel Jordan and the Palestinian Territories: Summary of Recommenda-
tions, IPCRI LAW & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REGIONAL TRADE PAPERS NO. 2, at 1
(May 1995) (recommending finding mechanism for direct Palestinian access to interna-
tional waters through a port in Gaza).
47. SMALL BUSINESS SUPPORT PROJECT, How TO CONDUCT BUSINESS IN THE
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 91 (1996) [hereinafter How TO CONDUCT PALESTINIAN
BUSINESS].
48. Samir Abdullah, From the Editor, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PULSE 1,1 (Sept.-Oct. 1996)
(noting that Israeli border closings "continue to restrict entry of Palestinian labour to the
Israeli market").
49. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1422. See also World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update,
supra note 44 (providing statistics on displacement of Palestinian workers in Israeli econ-
omy by other foreign workers).
50. UNSCO Quarterly Report, April 1997, supra note 40 (noting closures leading to de-
clines in household living standards and in private sector investment).
51. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. VII(1) (granting each side the right to de-
termine "the extent and conditions of the labor movement into its area"). See also Fidler,
supra note 3, at 537-38 (discussing the Economic Protocol's labor provisions).
52. See Levine, supra note 45, at 1405-06 (discussing how border closings have deterred
foreign investors); Knudsen, supra note 4, at 22 (commenting on how violence made it
"evident to many potential investors that the situation remains too uncertain and unstable
for any major surge of private investment"); World Bank, The West Bank and Gaza:
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with problems plaguing the aid program,53 the disrupted trade
situation and the lack of foreign investment has eroded confidence
in the entire peace process.'
A smaller, but still frustrating, element of the breakdown of the
free trade area has been the frequent use by Israel of non-tariff
barriers to Palestinian trade.55 Such non-tariff barriers on Pales-
tinian exports, particularly on those destined for third countries,
have weaker security rationales. Responding to this problem,
Levine has proposed that Israel "demonstrate convincingly that
any burdensome border controls and port procedures that are in
place are there solely for security purposes and not to create or
preserve foreign trade advantages or domestic market controls. '56
The imbalance in the way the trade relationship between Israel
and the Palestinian Territories operates has encouraged the Pales-
tinian Authority to take action to create more opportunities for
the Palestinian private sector. For example, in 1996 the Authority
announced that "all foreign companies selling goods in Gaza and
the West Bank must operate through a director importer, distribu-
tor or agent registered with the Palestinian Authority."57 The re-
quirement to use a Palestinian-registered agent or representative
has caused controversy in the Israeli business community that
Country Overview, supra note 6 (noting that "[t]he West Bank and Gaza has not yet
achieved the level of political stability required to attract major corporate investment").
53. For discussions of the problems on aid, see Fidler, supra note 3, at 540-43.
54. Knudsen wrote in 1996 that "[w]ith trade uncertain, private investment stagnant
and donor aid slow ... , the prospects of economic gains from peace materializing in the
short term appear fanciful." Knudsen, supra note 4, at 22.
55. See, e.g., Export Logistics: Israel's Non-Tariff Trade Barriers, 1 PALESTINE ECON.
PULSE 6, 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1996) (noting report by USAID's Small Business Support Program
on Israeli non-tariff barriers experienced at the Damia and Rafah crossing points into Jor-
dan and Egypt). Non-tariff barriers are national regulations that restrict trade flows with-
out utilizing tariff duties. Non-tariff barriers include such things as "customs valuation,
import licensing rules, subsidies, investment performance requirements, rules restricting
government procurement to domestic producers, compatibility standards, quality stan-
dards, health and safety regulations, labeling laws, inspection and testing requirements,
and lack of intellectual property protection." JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
TEXT 378 (3d ed. 1995). The Palestinian Authority has created some non-tariff barriers of
its own. See, e.g., New Labeling Regulation in PA Areas, 20 MIDDLE EAST ExECUTIVE
REP. 4, 4 (Jan., 1997) (reporting new regulation on labeling requirements issued by the
Palestinian Authority for products entering areas controlled by the Authority).
56. Levine, supra note 45, at 1407.
57. GIL FELLER AND YAACOV YISRAELI, BUSINESS LAWS AND ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA 156 (1996). For the text of this an-
nouncement, see Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Economy and Trade, Notifi-
cation, Oct. 1, 1996 (on file with author).
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fears losing the Palestinian import market to Palestinian firms.3
According to the Palestine Economic Pulse, this new policy should
theoretically benefit Palestinians "financially through the regain-
ing of a market share" as regards imports and the subsequent
marketing of such imported goods.59 While the new import agency
policy might benefit Palestinian companies vis-d-vis Israeli firms,
some in the Palestinian private sector are voicing concerns about
the new policy leading to "distribution monopolies" created by the
licensing scheme.6W It is still too early to tell what impact this new
policy will have on the free trade area, and "[s]ome pessimism still
remains regarding the ability of the PNA [Palestinian National
Authority] to enforce this new regulation. '61
B. Customs Union
The customs union between Israel and the Palestinian Territo-
ries has not been successful either. As noted earlier, 2 the Israelis
and the Palestinians differed in the negotiations over the Eco-
nomic Protocol as to the creation of a customs union. According
to Molkner, "[t]he goal of the customs union is to prevent leakage
of low-tariff imported goods from the Palestinian Territories into
Israel."'  The impact on the Palestinians for accepting the customs
union was higher prices for imported products because Israeli tar-
iff rates are set higher than the Palestinians would set them if they
had the ability to do so. These higher duty costs are passed onto
the Palestinian consumer.64 While the Palestinians face higher
costs for imports, the trade-off for them was the freedom of
movement of goods into Israel and access for Palestinians to the
Israeli labor market.6 Theoretically, the customs union was not
optimal from the perspective of Palestinian economic develop-
ment but was tolerable for an interim period because of the free
movement of goods and the labor opportunities in Israel. In prac-
58. Palestinian Agencies: A Bitter Pill for Israel to Swallow, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PULSE
9, 9 (Sept.-Oct. 1996) (commenting on concerns expressed by Israeli businesses about Pal-
estinians "stealing 'their' market" under the new policy).
59. Id
60. Id See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
61. Palestinian Agencies: A Bitter Pill for Israel to Swallow, supra note 58, at 9.
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
63. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1447.
64. Id at 1448; Knudsen, supra note 4, at 21.
65. Knudsen, supra note 4, at 21.
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tice, the breakdown of the free movement of goods and labor op-
portunities has left the Palestinians bearing higher costs for im-
ports under the customs union without the offsetting economic
benefits. Thus, the customs union exacerbates the economic diffi-
culties the Palestinians face.
Another adverse affect of the customs union on the trade
framework established under the Economic Protocol is that it
handicaps the Palestinian Authority's efforts to promote Palestin-
ian exports. Molkner observes that the customs union "weakens
[the Palestinian Authority's] capacity to negotiate favorable trade
terms with third countries."'  The Palestinian Authority cannot
offer third countries reduced tariff rates for their products because
it is locked into the customs union driven by Israeli tariff duties.67
As a result, the Palestinian Authority cannot offer other states
"favorable access to their domestic market as a quid pro quo for
reciprocal access to a given foreign market."' Unless Israel has a
preferential trading arrangement with countries that may consti-
tute markets for Palestinian goods, the Palestinian Authority is left
to ask for non-reciprocal, preferential treatment for Palestinian
goods. Unfortunately, many of the countries "that most interest
Palestinian exporters are often countries with which Israel has lit-
tle or no trade. '69
Another way in which the customs union hurts Palestinian eco-
nomic development is the fact that the tariff revenue unfairly ac-
crues to the Israeli government rather than to the Palestinian
Authority. Under the Economic Protocol, tariff duties paid on
goods destined for the Palestinian Territories are to be allocated
to the Palestinian Authority.7° The payment of tariff duties to the
Palestinian Authority "is fundamental to the revenue performance
of the PNA, which has surpassed all expectations and ... was con-
tinuing to yield surprisingly buoyant receipts. '71 Molkner notes,
however, that the Palestinian Authority has lost "tens of millions
of dollars of revenues" because Palestinian businesses have gener-
ally used Israeli importers, meaning that goods really destined for
66. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1448.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. 111(15).
71. Development in Palestine: A New Direction, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PuLsE 2, 2 (May-
June 1996).
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the Palestinian Territories are marked as Israeli imports.3 Tariff
revenue on such imports flows to Israel' because the Economic
Protocol only requires revenue to flow to the Palestinian Author-
ity "when the final destination explicitly stated in the import
documentation is a corporation registered by the Palestinian
Authority and conducting business activity in the Areas."74 The
loss of so much revenue makes the Palestinian Authority more
dependent on aid for funding its activities. The change in the way
imports into the Palestinian Territories are handled may affect the
tariff duty payment problem. Under the new policy,75 all imports
into the Territories will have to state explicitly that the final desti-
nation is "a corporation registered by the Palestinian Authority
and conducting business activity in the Areas. 76 Tariff revenues,
thus, should flow more directly to the Palestinian Authority, re-
ducing the amount of revenue now lost because of the dominance
of Israeli importers in the Palestinian market.77
Another problem with the customs union is that it encourages
trade diversion-an economically inefficient outcome of trade
policy. As noted earlier, the customs union applies a tariff rate
that is higher than would probably exist if the Palestinian Author-
ity set its own rates.78 The result is that imports are diverted from
other and possibly more efficient sources to Israeli producers who
have duty-free access to the Palestinian market under the Eco-
nomic Protocol.7 9 Theoretically, the costs of trade diversion could
be offset by Palestinian enterprises producing competing products,
which would be trade creation80 Palestinian enterprises have not,
however, created much trade because of the breakdown of the
free movement of goods, the lack of foreign investment, and the
ineffective use of aid.
72. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1448.
73. Id.
74. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. 1(15).
75. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. 1HI(15).
77. Palestinian Agencies: A Bitter Pill for Israel to Swallow, supra note 58, at 9
(discussing the impact of new Palestinian import agency policy on tariff revenue payments
from Israel to the Palestinian Authority).
78. Molkner, supra note 1, at 1448 (noting that the customs union means that "the Pal-
estinian customs rate is probably higher than it otherwise would be").
79. Ussama Dabbagh, Prospects for Trade in Palestine, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PULSE 14,
15 (July-Aug. 1996) (arguing that "[t]rade diversion has been caused by the imposition of
Israeli customs tariffs on imports from the rest of the world").
80. Id. (arguing that higher cost imports "should have encouraged the substitution of
such imports by domestic production in the [west Bank and Gaza Strip]").
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The customs union also creates a more cumbersome set of me-
chanics for importing goods into the Palestinian Territories. An
importer has to deal with three sets of rules: the Economic Proto-
col, the Israeli rules, and the Palestinian rules. Under the Eco-
nomic Protocol, "[e]ach side will issue import licenses to its own
importers ... "81 Under the new Palestinian import agency policy,
the Palestinian Authority presumably will only issue import li-
censes to Palestinian-registered importers.8 The Palestinian Min-
istry of Economy, Trade, and Industry ("Ministry of Economy")
issues import licenses for areas under the control of the Palestinian
Authority; import licenses for West Bank areas still under Israeli
control are issued by the Israeli Civil Administration.83 The Minis-
try of Economy must issue a license for each import shipment be-
cause of the quotas established in the Economic Protocol.84 For
imports falling within the quota limits, the Economic Protocol im-
poses rules of origin on goods imported from Jordan, Egypt, and
other Arab countries.8 For imports that fall outside of the Pales-
tinian import quotas, Israeli customs law affects import shipments
licensed by the Palestinian Authority because Israeli customs rules
govern at that point.86 While this complex set of import rules does
not create insurmountable obstacles to importing into the Pales-
tinian Territories, the import mechanics are far from the "one
stop" set of rules that would make Palestinian importing more ef-
ficient.
C. Promotion of Exports
The final element of the Oslo trade framework was the Pales-
tinian Authority's power to negotiate agreements with countries to
promote Palestinian economic development. To date, the results
of the Palestinian Authority's efforts to gain access for Palestinian
exports to regional and global markets are mixed. As mentioned
earlier, the customs union has frustrated the strategy of promoting
Palestinian exports because it limits what the Palestinian Author-
ity can offer other countries in terms of access to the Palestinian
market. Even the progress that has been made is undercut by
81. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. III (9).
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83. How TO CoNDuCr PALESTINIAN BUSINESS, supra note 47, at 108.
84. 1&
85. Economic Protocol, supra note 24, art. 111(8).
86. Id. art. III(10).
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other circumstances or events that limit the near-term potential for
large increases in Palestinian exports to foreign markets.
1. Regional Trade Arrangements
An obvious outlet for Palestinian exports is the markets of other
countries in the Middle East.' The World Bank estimated in 1993
that, absent the asymmetrical trading structure imposed on the
Palestinian Territories by Israel during occupation, the West Bank
and Gaza would have purchased only 36% of total imports from
Israel (compared with the actual figure of 90% during the mid-
1980's) and sold 20% of total exports to Israel (compared with the
actual figure of 75% during the mid-1980's). 88 The World Bank
estimated that Palestinian trade with the rest of the Arab world
absent the occupation's customs union would have been much
higher, with 40% of Palestinian exports flowing to Arab coun-
tries.' These World Bank calculations illustrate how significantly
the occupation-era customs union diverted Palestinian trade away
from the rest of the Middle East region to Israel.
The Palestinian Authority has been active in trying to create
opportunities for Palestinian exports in the Middle East. The Pal-
estinian Authority signed a Trade Cooperation Agreement with
Jordan in 1995. 0 According to the Palestinian Authority, this
"agreement provides for certain preferential tax and customs ex-
ceptions for two-way trade with respect to fifty Jordanian and Pal-
estinian products." 91  While the Palestinian-Jordanian trade
agreement seems limited in scope, part of the limitation stems
from the Palestinian Authority's inability to change the tariffs im-
posed under the Oslo customs union. The Palestinian Authority
can offer Jordanian goods only limited preferential treatment un-
der the restricted areas in which the Palestinian Authority can es-
tablish tariff duties.
87. "Arab countries are a good target market for [Palestinian] industrial goods and
services. This market represents $50-60 billion. Thus, capturing 1-2% of this market ...
could mean a break-through for the Palestinian economy." Dabbagh, supra note 79, at 14.
88. WORLD BANK, The Economy, supra note 8, at 45.
89. Id.
90. Palestinian Trade: Terms of Reference, 1 PALESTINE ECON. PULSE 6, 6 (Sept.-OcL
1996).
91. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, 2 INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS &
REGULATIONS 26 (1995) [hereinafter INVEST IN PALESTNE: LAWS].
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The Palestinian Authority and Egypt have signed an "interim
cooperation agreement" on trade, but apparently this is not a for-
mal trade agreement. 92 In February 1997, Egypt and the Palestin-
ian Authority initialed an agreement that, among other things,
committed them "to make a thorough study of a draft agreement
regulating transport and transit trade between both countries."93
The Oslo customs union will restrict, however, the ability of the
Palestinian delegation to offer the Egyptians much in the way of
preferential access to the Palestinian market.
It should also be noted that Israeli border closures and controls
adversely affect Palestinian trade with Jordan and Egypt. As men-
tioned earlier, Palestinians have experienced problems with Israeli
officials at crossing points into Jordan and Egypt. I Border clo-
sures have, of course, an even more adverse effect on Palestinian
exports than routine Israeli non-tariff barriers.95 Not only does the
border problem inhibit the export potential of domestic Palestin-
ian enterprises but it also deters foreign investors who were con-
sidering the Palestinian Territories as an export platform.9
Despite the limitations imposed by the customs union and the
border problems, the Palestinian Minister of Economy noted in
late September 1996 that since the formation of the Palestinian
Authority "there has been a new trend towards increased foreign
trade with the Arab states."'97 The Minister of Economy also
stated that the Palestinian Authority "is trying to increase its ex-
ports to Arab markets and in this context relies on Arab states
granting preferential treatment of Palestinian goods, in line with
92. Palestinian Trade: Terms of Reference, supra note 90, at 6.
93. Egyptian-Palestinian Agreement on Investment Initialed, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 25,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
94. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Husam Abu Dagga, Gaza's High Value Added Crops-Export Potential, 1
PALESTINE ECON. PULSE 22, 22 (Sept.-Oct. 1996) (noting that Palestinian growers lost
$3.45 million in revenues during the 1995-96 export season because of border closures
during the carnation export season).
96. See Levine, supra note 45, at 1405 (describing a foreign investor interested in Gaza
as an export platform to European markets who was deterred from actually investing by
the risks associated with Gaza's borders).
97. Palestinian Economy Minister on Rising Budget Deficit, Falling Investment, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. The Minister of Economy noted that in 1995 the Palestinian Authority is-
sued "310 licenses to import from Arab states ... out of a total of 634" issued. Id. The
Palestinian Authority issued 92 licenses to import from Jordan, 218 licenses to import
from Egypt, and 324 licenses to import from other states in the world. Id.
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the Saudi Council of Ministers' resolution to exempt Palestinian
products from customs duty."98
Even if the Palestinian Authority did not face the economic
problems caused by the customs union and Israel's border policies,
the Middle East may not be as promising for Palestinian exports as
some might hope. The countries that fall within the Middle East
and North African ("MENA") region share a number of charac-
teristics that negatively reflect upon the MENA region's economic
potential. MENA countries generally have high tariff rates to pro-
tect domestic enterprises, which discourages exporters in other
MENA countries and eliminates the incentives for protected firms
to be competitive by exporting to other regional and global mar-
kets.99 As a result, intra-regional trade within the MENA area is
very low, accounting for only seven to eight per cent of total
MENA trade.'0 Unless the trade policies of MENA countries
change dramatically, the MENA area may not offer much hope for
Palestinian exports.1°1
2. Trade with the European Union
Another potential market for Palestinian exports is the Euro-
pean Union. Since 1986, the European Union has provided trade
concessions to certain Palestinian products.1 2 Under European
Union regulations, "all Palestinian manufactured products enjoy
free access to the Community market and key Palestinian agricul-
98. IL
99. Bernard Hoekman, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No.
1513, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE ARAB
WORLD: TRADE POLICY PRIORITIES AND PITFALLS 3 (1995).
100. WORLD BANK, CLAIMNG THE FUTURE: CHOOSING PROSPERITY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 16-17 (1995).
101. One Palestinian commentator noted this by arguing that "[a]ny feasible short term
trade relations with Jordan require the removal or relaxation of existing regulations im-
posed by Jordan on Palestinian imports." Dabbagh, supra note 79, at 15.
102. INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAws, supra note 95, at 26. The Palestinian Authority re-
fers to these trade concessions as a trade agreement, iL, but the concessions are unilateral
actions of the European Union rather than formal agreements between the European
Union and the Palestinians. The initial regulation in which preferential treatment was
given to Palestinian products is Council Regulation 3363/86, 1986 OJ. (L 306) 103.
Regulation 3363186 was replaced in 1991 by Council Regulation 1134191,1991 OJ. (L 112)
1, which widened the scope of preferences for Palestinian agricultural products. In 1992,
Council Regulation 190192, 1992 OJ. (L 21) 7, instituted a tariff quota for Palestinian
fresh strawberries.
1998]
174 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tural products are granted... free or concessional access."' 1 3 Both
the European Union and the Palestinian Authority demonstrated
enthusiasm for building the existing trade concessions into a for-
mal trade agreement,"° which came to pass in December 1996
when the European Union and PLO initialed the Euro-
Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-
operation between the European Community and the PLO for the
Benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.105 The Interim Association Agreement forms part of a
larger European Union initiative called the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership launched in November 1995 that is designed to create
a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area through successive bilateral
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements between the European Union
and countries in the MENA region. Prior to the Interim Associa-
tion Agreement, the European Union had concluded Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements with Israel, Tunisia, and Morocco.1 6
The Interim Association Agreement involves more than the
trading relationship between the European Union and the Pales-
tinians because it covers a wide range of issues such as direct in-
vestment, capital movements, intellectual property protection, and
political cooperation." While the entire Interim Association
Agreement is important, this section will only briefly look at the
trade-specific portions of it. According to the European Commis-
sion:
The main consequence of the agreement is the confirma-
tion of a free trade area between the EC and the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, in accordance with WTO rules.
103. Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on Future
European Union Economic Assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
COM(95)505 final, at 5.
104. EU/Palestine: Union to Negotiate Interim Agreement with Palestinians, EUROPEAN
REPORT, Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
105. EU/Palestine: Interim Association Agreement Signed with the PLO, EUROPEAN
REPORT, Feb. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curuws File. The Interim As-
sociation Agreement was signed by Arafat and the European Union Council President on
February 24, 1997. Id
106. Conclusions of December 15-16 European Council, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY
REP., Dec. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (welcoming agree-
ments concluded with Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia).
107. See Interim Association Agreement in Proposal for a Council Decision concerning
the conclusion by the European Community of a Euro-Mediterranean Interim Associa-
tion Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community and the
PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
COM(97)51 final [hereinafter Council Proposal].
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The agreement commits the parties to the progressive es-
tablishment of a free trade area over a transitional period
not extending beyond 2001, in conformity with the
GATT.1'8
The Interim Association Agreement does not radically change
the nature of trade between the Palestinian Territories and the
European Union because trade between the two was already free
by virtue of (1) the European Union's granting of free access for
industrial goods and preferential access for selected agricultural
products from the West Bank and Gaza, and (2) the free trade ar-
rangements already in place between Israel and the European
Union.109 The dependence of the Palestinian Authority on Israel's
trade relations because of the customs union is illustrated by the
Interim Association Agreement: without Israel's existing free
trade arrangement with the European Union, the Palestinian
Authority has no power to grant the European Union reciprocal
free access to Palestinian markets.
The potential economic impact of the Interim Association
Agreement on the Palestinian Territories is uncertain. Prior to the
Agreement, there was minimal trade between the European Un-
ion and the Territories. 10 On the import side, the Agreement
might produce lower cost imports as European Union imports
force Israeli producers to face competition for the Palestinian
market, thus creating efficiency-enhancing trade from the Pales-
tinian perspective. On the export side, the benefits are unlikely to
be significant because the Agreement does nothing to eliminate
the obstacles that currently exist to Palestinian exports to the
European Union, such as the breakdown in the free movement of
goods from the Palestinian Territories to Israel. The negative ef-
fect of this breakdown on the prospects for Palestinian exports to
the European Union also deters foreign investors from thinking of
the Palestinian Territories as an export platform for European
markets. Hoekman argues that "[t]he geographic advantage that
the MENA region used to have-because Eastern Europe was ef-
fectively closed to open exchange with the West-has now disap-
peared.""' The Central and Eastern European countries
10& IM. at la. See also id. art. 3, at 5.
109. Id. at la-lb.
110. Id. at la (noting that trade "flows have in practice been small").
111. Hoekman, supra note 99, at 1. Since the opening up of Central and Eastern
Europe, the European Union has been pursuing trade liberalization strategies there and
1998]
176 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
("CEECs") are now reclaiming their geographical advantage, al-
lowing them "to exploit sub-contracting of manufacturing prod-
ucts for export to the [European Union] to a much greater degree
than the MENA countries. 112
Theoretically, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative
could lead to an increase in Palestinian exports to other MENA
countries for two reasons. First, the Euro-Mediterranean Agree-
ments oblige MENA countries to liberalize their economies by re-
ducing tariff rates vis-d-vis the European Union, which will expose
protected domestic industries to the forces of competition." 3 If
MENA governments were to extend this trade liberalization to
other MENA countries, Palestinian exports could benefit from the
resulting expansion of intra-MENA trade.
Second, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements contain liberal
rules of origin that allow the MENA party to count materials im-
ported from other MENA countries as materials originating in the
MENA party. For example, under the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement between the European Union and Tunisia, materials
originating in Morocco (which also has a trade agreement with the
European Union) shall be considered as originating in Tunisia for
purposes of the European Union-Tunisian rules of origin. 4 Un-
der such liberal rules of origin, Palestinian exports to MENA
countries party to Euro-Mediterranean Agreements might in-
crease if they could be incorporated into products exported to the
European Union without jeopardizing the products' preferential
tariff treatment. Technically, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
between the European Union and Tunisia does not accord Pales-
tinian-originating products the benefit of the liberal rules of origin
because it does not include the Palestinian Territories in the list of
MENA countries to which the cumulative rules of origin apply.
has reached Association Agreements (known as 'Europe Agreements') with Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, containing provi-
sions on reciprocal free movement of goods. Id. at 33.
11- Id at 1.
113. Jon Marks, Looking for a New Deal from the EU; Middle East, MIDDLE EAST
ECON. DIG., May 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
114. Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Communities and their
Member States and the Republic of Tunisia, Protocol No. 4 Concerning the Definition of
Originating Products and Methods of Administrative Cooperation, art. 4(2), in Proposal
for a Decision of the Council and the Commission on the conclusion of a Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communi-
ties and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other
part, COM(95)235 final.
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The European Union and Tunisia might, however, allow Palestin-
ian-originating products to benefit from these rules of origin. The
Interim Association Agreement does not contain any provisions
on cumulative rules of origin because Israeli customs rules largely
control these questions under the customs union.115
The theoretical possibility of increased Palestinian exports to
other MENA markets is called into question, however, by the
havoc created for all Palestinian exports by the breakdown of the
Israeli-Palestinian free movement of goods. If Palestinian enter-
prises cannot physically deliver exports to customers in a timely
fashion because of Israel's security concerns, then customers will
find more reliable foreign or domestic suppliers, and Palestinian
economic development will continue to stagnate, which will fur-
ther undermine the peace process.
3. Trade with the United States
The Palestinian Authority also has actively sought to promote
exports to the United States. When the Palestinian Territories
were under Israeli occupation, goods produced in the West Bank
and Gaza and exported to the United States enjoyed the preferen-
tial treatment accorded to Israeli products under the United
States-Israel Free Trade Agreement ("U.S.-Israel FTA") because
they were marked "Made in Israel" and shipped to the United
States through Israel."6 The peace process forced a change in this
situation as Palestinians began to gain autonomy. In 1995, the
U.S. Customs Service issued regulations requiring products from
the Palestinian Territories imported into the United States to be
marked either "Made in Gaza" or "Made in the West Bank."1"
This change forced Palestinian products out of the preferential
trading arrangement established in the U.S.-Israel FTA and gave
Israeli products a competitive advantage over Palestinian products
in the United States.
To offset the impact of removing Palestinian products from
treatment under the U.S.-Israel FTA, the United States in 1995
115. See Interim Association Agreement, Protocol No. 3 Concerning the Definition of
the Concept of "Originating Products" and Methods of Administrative Cooperation, in
Council Proposal, supra note 107, at 49 et seq.
116. See New Marking for West Bank, Gaza Goods Omits Palestinian Goods from Is-
rael FTA, 12 INT'LTRADE REP. 874 (1995) [hereinafter New Marking for West Bank].
117. See Country of Origin Marking of Products from the West Bank and Gaza, 60 Fed.
Reg. 17,607 (1995).
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extended preferential treatment to Palestinian goods under the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). n 8 Palestinian
officials, however, argued that GSP treatment would not provide
economic benefits to the Palestinian economy because GSP ex-
cluded food and textiles-the very products that Palestinians could
effectively export.119 Recognizing that the peace process was hav-
ing the perverse effect of economically hurting the Palestinians for
gaining some autonomy, the Clinton administration proposed ex-
tending duty-free treatment to all Palestinian products imported
into the United States in exchange for duty-free access to the Pal-
estinian Territories for American products.2 0 Legislation effectu-
ating this proposal was introduced into Congress and eventually
was passed and signed into law by President Clinton on October 3,
1996.121
Technically, the legislation does not establish a free trade
agreement. Rather, Congress has amended the United States-
Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act to authorize the
President to proclaim elimination or modification of tariff duties
for products originating in the Palestinian Territories. 122 In es-
sence, under this law the United States will treat Palestinian and
Israeli goods equally-as it used to do during occupation. In re-
turn for getting duty-free access to the United States, the Pales-
tinian Authority agreed to grant American products duty-free ac-
cess to the Palestinian Territories as well as national treatment
within them. 23 The Palestinian Authority could make these un-
dertakings because American products receive duty-free access to
the Israeli market under the U.S.-Israel FTA, so the U.S.-
Palestinian arrangement conforms with the Oslo customs union.
In announcing the new law, the White House stated that the
"special trade status will provide new employment opportunities
118. Proclamation No. 6778,60 Fed. Reg. 15,455 (1995).
119. New Marking for West Bank; supra note 116, at 874.
120. Kantor Sets Free Trade Deal with Palestinians, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct.
17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
121. President Grants Duty-Free Entry to Products From West Bank, Gaza, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. 1569 (1996).
122. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act, Amendment, Pub. L.
No. 104-234, §1, 110 Stat. 3058, 3058 (1996).
123. President Grants Duty-Free Entry to Products From West Bank, Gaza, supra note
121, at 1569. The undertakings from the Palestinian Authority were made in diplomatic
correspondence with the United States in October 1995. Letter from Timothy Richards,
Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Western Europe and the Middle East, to
David Fidler, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Blooming-
ton (Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with author).
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for Palestinians outside Israel proper and lure increased foreign
investment to the West Bank and Gaza.""2 4 While it is too early to
assess the accuracy of this prediction, Palestinian exports to the
United States are subject to the same border closures as Palestin-
ian exports to every other market. Access in theory to the United
States will not provide employment or lure foreign investors while
access in reality remains uncertain.
4. Palestinian Laws Affecting Exports
Attempting to build openings in foreign markets for Palestinian
products has been the major emphasis of the Palestinian Authority
in promoting exports. The Palestinian Authority has also at-
tempted to create conditions within the Palestinian Territories to
attract investments with export potential. The Palestinian Law on
the Encouragement of Investment allows the Palestinian High
Agency for the Encouragement of Investment to grant special in-
centives to "export projects" and to "export-oriented agricultural
projects."1  The authority to grant such special incentives
"suggests that the PNA wants to adopt an 'export model' of eco-
nomic development as opposed to an 'import substitution' model
... . 126The Palestinian Authority does not require the exporta-
tion of products for investment approval, which is in keeping with
international standards on trade-related investment measures.1'1
The Palestinian Authority has also established the mechanics
needed to engage in an export transaction. The Ministry of Econ-
omy has, according to the Palestinian Authority, simplified export
procedures "to encourage and promote exports."'' The Palestin-
ian Authority claimed in its official documents distributed at the
second MENA conference in 1995 that no export license is
needed; merely an official certificate of origin certifying that the
goods are of Palestinian origin is required. 129 A guide to conduct-
124. White House Statement on West Bank and Gaza, U.S. NEIWS1,IRE, Oct. 3, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
125. Law on the Encouragement of Investment, art. 12, reprinted in Fidler, supra note
3, at 607. For a critical analysis of article 12, see Fidler, supra note 3, at 564-66.
126. Fidler, supra note 3, at 566.
127. Id. at 581.
128. INvEsT IN PALESTINE: LAWS, supra note 91, at 26.
129. Id. See also MAZEN E. QUFTY ET AL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusINEss IN
PALESTINE 45 (1995) (stating that no export license is needed, only a certificate of origin).
This certificate of origin is very important in establishing that the Palestinian export can
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ing business in the Palestinian Territories, funded by the U.S.
Agency for International Development ("USAID") and published
in January 1996, states, however, that Palestinian exporters need
both an export license and the certificate of origin.130 This guide
even provides a copy of the official Ministry of Economy export
license application. 131 Either the Palestinian Authority changed
the rule between the second MENA conference in November 1995
and the publication of the USAID handbook in January 1996, or it
needs to be more accurate about its simplified export procedures.
D. Industrial Zones
The need for Palestinian economic development, combined with
the continuing lack of such development, has led to searches for
ways to "jump start" trade with and investment in the Palestinian
Territories. The World Bank, Palestinian Authority, Israel, and
donor countries like the United States have been developing plans
for a number of industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza that
are supposed to act as economic catalysts for the Palestinian econ-
omy.-' The World Bank reports that the Palestinian Authority
and Israel have agreed to cooperate on three industrial zones-
one at Carni in Gaza and two in the West Bank at Jenin and Tul-
karem133 The industrial zones program seeks "to create a number
of 'islands' of procedural and legal clarity that will also be assured
exceptional security treatment."'134 This program thus responds to
the general problems of security (discussed above) and the lack of
an adequate Palestinian commercial law framework (discussed
below). The planned industrial zones figure prominently in Pales-
tinian trade hopes because products produced in the zones are
supposed to have more secure access to the Israeli market and will
get duty-free treatment into the United States and the European
Union, making the zones "attractive 'export platforms' to those
markets. 135
benefit from preferential trading arrangements, like with the United States or the Euro-
pean Union, because such arrangements will have specific rules of origin.
130. How TO CONDUCT PALESTINIAN BUSINESS, supra note 47, at 102-03.
131. 1& app. E(8).
132. World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Country Overview, supra note 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. See also Julian Borger, Clouds over Middle East Peace: Trade in the West Bank
is Exposed to Israeli Sanctions, THE GUARDIAN, July 23, 1997, at 18 (reporting that
"[tihere is interest in the [Carni, Gaza] zone from European and US investors who want
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The industrial zones sound good in theory, but the actual im-
plementation of the theory has been delayed and still remains elu-
sive. The idea of industrial zones has been around since early in
the peace process, but nearly four years later the Palestinians and
Israelis have not concluded the necessary agreements, nor have
the Palestinians completed drafting the legal framework for the
zones. 6 Although talks on the industrial zones between the Is-
raelis and Palestinians have continued despite the freeze in the
peace process,'3 any major economic impact from the zones is still
a distant prospect. Palestinian businesspeople have grown more
frustrated with the "continuous squabbling between Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators over who will control the flow of goods and
people" through the industrial zonesY3 Some Palestinian busi-
nesses purposefully avoid the industrial zones because they have
become "tinged [with] political concerns. ' 139 The "islands" of le-
gal clarity, assured market access, and special security treatment
are in danger of being covered by the stormy waters of the peace
process.
E. Legal and Political Problems
In addition to the issues raised previously, a number of legal and
political problems also adversely affect the prospects for Palestin-
ian trade. While a full discussion of these problems is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is nonetheless important to raise them,
however briefly.
1. Inadequate Legal Infrastructure
A continuing problem for prospects for Palestinian economic
development is the inadequate nature of the legal infrastructure
to benefit from the territories' low labour costs and preferential access to EU and US
markets.").
136. World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Country Ove. view, supra note 6 (reporting that the
Palestinians are still drafting the legal framework and discussing market access agreements with
Israel).
137. Borger, supra note 135, at 18.
138. Deborah Horan, Palestine: Ambitious Investors Get a Rude Awakening, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, May 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
139. Id
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for conducting business in the Palestinian Territories. 140 In 1993,
the World Bank reported that "[d]espite some improvements in
the recent past, there remains a widespread perception among OT
entrepreneurs that the current business environment is ambiguous,
complex and unpredictable. 14 1 The World Bank expressed the
hope in 1993 that the peace process "should make possible a thor-
ough review and overhaul of the existing legal and regulatory
framework to provide the private sector with a sounder legal basis
for commercial transactions."1 42 This hope has not been fulfilled.
In a recent 1997 overview of the West Bank and Gaza, the World
Bank stated that "[i]n addition to political uncertainty, the busi-
ness environment suffers from confusing commercial legislation
and a lack of public sector regulatory institutions.' 4 3 Even in
some areas where the Palestinian Authority has tried to reform
Palestinian commercial law, the results have not been encourag-
ing. When the Palestinian Authority issued the Law on the En-
couragement of Investment, "World Bank experts, lawyers work-
ing to promote the peace process, international legal scholars, and
potential foreign investors quickly perceived that the Investment
Law was a very flawed document."' 4 While the consequences of
terrorist acts and subsequent border closings no doubt compli-
cated Palestinian legal reform efforts, the blame cannot be laid en-
tirely at Israel's doorstep. In connection with the Law on the En-
couragement of Investment, for example, the timely and adequate
drafting of this major piece of legal reform "was in the hands of
the Palestinians themselves, and they had an opportunity to dem-
onstrate to the world that they understood the importance of for-
eign direct investment to the achievement of peace and Palestinian
autonomy.'14  As suggested by the World Bank's recent comment
140. For an overview of the need for Palestinian legal reform, see Hiram E. Chodosh
and Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study: Consensus and Assessment of the New
Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARv. INT'L L. J. 375 (1997).
141. WORLD BANK, Overview, supra note 5, at 17.
142 1&
143. World Bank, The West Bank and Gaza: Country Overview, supra note 6. The
World Bank has proposed for its 1997 fiscal year a Legal Development Project to
"support the modernization and harmonization of existing legislation, the improvement of
judicial infrastructure, the development of legal information and training and technical
assistance for judges and court personnel." World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update:
January-March 1997, supra note 44.
144. David P. Fidler, Economic Development, Foreign Investment and the Peace Proc-
ess: Recent Events Make Revision of Palestinian Investment Law Even More Critical, 19
MIDDLE EAST EXEcUTIVE REP. 8,23 (Nov. 1996).
145. Id.
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about confusing commercial legislation and the lack of public sec-
tor regulatory institutions, the story of the Law on the Encour-
agement of Investment is not unique in connection with Palestin-
ian legal reform.
2. Trade Monopolies
Even more disturbing than the problems concerning needed
commercial law reform is the Palestinian Authority's practice of
creating trade monopolies for itself. The Palestinian Authority
exclusively controls, for example, the importation of many prod-
ucts, including cement, petroleum, and flour.1" In some situations,
Israel supports these trade monopolies in order to protect Israeli
suppliers from competition in the Palestinian market. 47 In addi-
tion, not all the revenue generated by these trade monopolies goes
to the Palestinian Authority and private enterprises because Ara-
fat reportedly takes a cut of the money'4
Concerns about the attempts by the Palestinian Authority to
monopolize sectors of the Palestinian economy are commonplace
among investors and groups trying to facilitate the peace process
and Palestinian economic development. In a letter to President
Clinton dated April 4, 1997, the Israeli director of the widely-
respected, Bethlehem-based Israel/Palestinian Center for Re-
search and Information urged the United States to use its influ-
ence to put an end to monopolistic Palestinian Authority policies
that "will strangle the private sector and delay or prevent eco-
nomic development."' 149 Palestinian Authority attempts to mo-
nopolize aspects of the Palestinian economy are thus not hidden
secrets. Such behavior on the part of the Palestinian Authority di-
146. David Hirst, Shameless in Gaza, THE GUARDIAN, April 21,1997, at 8.
147. J& "The Government of Israel should not allow or facilitate the establishment of
monopolistic economic policies involving Israeli companies and supported by the Pales-
tinian Authority. This is detrimental to the Palestinian economy and has created great
resentment within Palestinian business circles as well as on the ground in the West Bank
and Gaza." Gershon Baskin, Recommendations on Steps to be Taken with Regard to Pal-
estinian Economic Development Needs in Relationship with Israeli Security Needs, IPCRI
Memorandum, November 3,1996 (on file with author).
148. "For example, out of the $74 for which a ton of cement is sold in Gaza, S17 goes to
the Authority and $17 into his own [Arafat's] account in a Tel Aviv bank." Hirst, Sham-
less in Gaza, supra note 146, at T8. See infra, text accompanying notes 150-157
149. Letter to President William Jefferson Clinton from Gershon Baskin, Israeli Direc-
tor of the Israel/Palestinian Center for Research and Information, April 4, 1997 (on file
with author).
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rectly calls into question its commitment to free market enterprise
as the model for Palestinian economic development and casts a
dark shadow across Palestinian trade efforts.
3. Corruption
The lack of an adequate and functioning system of commercial
law, combined with heavy government intervention in the econ-
omy, is a recipe for corruption. The Palestinian Authority is rife
with corruption. Rumors about corruption have plagued the Pal-
estinian Authority since its establishment, but what was widely
suspected dramatically broke open to public disclosure in the first
half of 1997. In early April, the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz pub-
lished a report detailing secret bank accounts in Tel Aviv used by
Arafat and other senior Palestinian officials.150 Later in April,
David Hirst of The Guardian newspaper in Britain published a de-
tailed story on the extent of corruption in the Palestinian Author-
ity. Hirst's investigations led him to a blistering conclusion: Arafat
"and his coterie of unofficial economic 'advisors' have thrown up a
ramshackle, nepotistic edifice of monopoly, racketeering and na-
ked extortion which merely enriches them as it further impover-
ishes society at large.' 151 Finally, in May 1997, the Palestinian
Authority released an internal audit of corruption that reported
that corruption and mismanagement caused the Palestinian
Authority to lose approximately $326 million in public funds,52
representing 40 percent of the Palestinian Authority's annual
budget. 53 Perhaps the public disclosure of the corruption prob-
lem, and the anger it has caused among Palestinians and donor
countries, will bring corruption under control. The Palestinian
Legislative Council has published a report that severely criticized
Arafat's cabinet and called for Arafat to replace all cabinet minis-
ters in an effort to bring credibility and accountability to the Pales-
tinian Authority."5 Sixteen of the eighteen members of Arafat's
cabinet have offered to resign as a result of the corruption scan-
150. See, e.g., Arafat's War Chest, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 7, 1997, at 10.
151. Hirst, Shameless in Gaza, supra note 146, at T8.
152. See Arafat-Ordered Audit Finds Palestinian Corruption, REUTERS, May 24, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
153. Avi Machlis, Arafat Facing "Democracy" Test: Leader is Under Pressure to Dis-
solve Cabinet and Tackle Corruption, FINANCIAL TIMES, August 16, 1997, at 3.
154. Id
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dal.55 In addition, "international donors, mostly from the Euro-
pean Union, threatened to cut off $1.4 billion of aid pledged but
not yet paid to Palestine when they got wind of the extent of the
[corruption] problem."'16 The scandal has tarnished the Palestin-
ian Authority and further hurt prospects for Palestinian economic
development.'l 7
4. Human Rights Abuses
The reputation of the Palestinian Authority has also been dam-
aged by the revelations of human rights abuses committed by the
Authority. In December 1996, Amnesty International released a
report on the human rights performance of the Palestinian
Authority since 1994.11 Amnesty International's conclusions were
disturbing:
Over the past two years widespread human rights abuses
have taken place in the areas under the jurisdiction of the
Palestinian Authority including large-scale arbitrary ar-
rests, prolonged detention without charge or trial of hun-
dreds of political detainees and the increasingly wide-
spread use of torture. At least nine people have died in
the custody of the Palestinian security services in circum-
stances where torture appears to have caused or contrib-
uted to their deaths. Those brought to trial for political
offenses have been almost invariably tried before a State
Security Court which allows summary, unfair and often
secret trials of offenders before military judges. Other
serious human fights abuses include unlawful killings and
possible extrajudicial executions. 59
The sting of the Amnesty International report apparently did
not register with Arafat and other Palestinian officials because
subsequent events have illustrated a lack of appreciation in the
155. Sharon Moshavi, Graft in His Government Weakens Arafat's Grip, BUSINESS
WEEK, Aug. 18-25,1997, at 61.
156. Id.
157. Neil MacFarquhar, The Sullen Zone: As Gaza Stagnates, Arafat is Blamed as Well
as Israel, N.Y. TMIES, Aug. 16, 1997, at 1 (noting that corruption and mismanagement are
not only making donor countries reconsider aid pledges but are also deepening the qualms
of the private sector about investing and doing business in the Palestinian Territories).
158. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: PROLONGED PO-
LITICAL DETENTION, TORTURE AND UNFAIR TRIALS (Dec, 1996).
159. Id at summary.
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Palestinian Authority for human rights. First, the Palestinian
Authority declared in April 1997 that any Palestinians who sell
land to Jews would be punished by the death penalty.160 This dec-
laration led to the deaths of at least three Palestinian real estate
agents suspected of selling land to Jews,' 6' and dozens more have
been "arrested and threatened with execution."1 62 This episode
prompted international criticism, including a U.S. House of Rep-
resentative's vote condemning the Palestinian Authority for the
killings. 163
Second, Arafat ordered the detention in May 1997 of Daoud
Kuttab, a Palestinian journalist who was directing live television
broadcasts of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 64 Arafat appar-
ently was unhappy with Kuttab's live broadcasts because the Leg-
islative Council had been critical about the Palestinian Authority
over corruption issues. 6 The detention of Kuttab aroused fierce
opposition in the United States and elsewhere. A Washington
Post editorial stated that the Kuttab affair is "certain to put Yasser
Arafat's increasing despotism squarely in the American public
eye.,,166
The human rights abuses directly attributable to the Palestinian
Authority give it a menacing, authoritarian image that adversely
affects prospects for Palestinian economic development. Dictator-
ships and kleptocracies have historically proven to be maladroit at
promoting trade and investments.
IV. CONCLUSION: No PEACE, No TRADE-NO TRADE, No PEACE
Analyzing the developments in Palestinian trade law during the
peace process points to a very daunting conclusion: without more
peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Palestinian trade will
remain uncertain because of its vulnerability to Israeli security ac-
160. Lisa Beyer, Let the Seller Beware: Arafat Says Palestinian Agents Selling Land to
Jews in the West Bank are Traitors, Punishable by Death, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 40.
161. Joel Greenberg, As Fear Spreads, Palestinian Land Broker Tells of Abduction,
N.Y. TIMES (INT'L), June 4,1997, at A12.
162. Beyer, Let the Seller Beware, supra note 160, at 40.
163. U.S. Lawmakers Slam Palestinian Killings, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 11, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
164. Serge Schemann, Palestinians Detain Reporter Who is Said to Have Irked Arafat,
N.Y. TIMES (INT'L), May 22, 1997, at All.
165. Id.
166. Palestinian Strongman, WASH. POST, May 22,1997, at A24.
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tions; but without more trade, the Palestinian people will continue
to lose confidence in the peace process as unemployment, poverty,
and despair create fertile ground for forces opposed to rap-
prochement with Israel. As Mel Levin has argued, the Israeli secu-
rity concerns and the Palestinian economic needs are both legiti-
mate.167 Levine sets out the mental framework needed to break
the downward spiraling cycle of "no peace, no trade-no trade, no
peace":
Realism dictates that both sides must enter a quest for
creative solutions with an honest acceptance of one an-
others' core requirements. This means that the Palestini-
ans must accept, as a minimum, that "free movement" is
not exclusively, or even primarily, an economic issue, and
that the Israelis must accept the presence of a determined
economic partner and competitor on their doorstep.
Good faith may or may not follow, but without these
going-in positions on both sides, it is prohibited. 68
In addition, the Palestinian Authority has to improve vastly its
performance by reforming its commercial law to conform to inter-
national standards, ending government trade monopolies, elimi-
nating corruption, and moving towards firm protection of human
rights.
The strategy for Palestinian economic development crafted by
the peace process pioneers was eminently rational and logical:
build a modem infrastructure using aid, access the lucrative Israeli
market, attract foreign investment, and develop an export-
oriented economy. As noted earlier, access to the Israeli and
other markets is essential to trade, and the opportunity to trade is
critical to prospective foreign investors. The implementation of
the economic development strategy through the Oslo Accords
followed three rational and logical channels: the free trade area,
the customs union, and Palestinian authority to promote exports.
Unfortunately, the strategy and the implementation mechanisms
for it have proved to be as fragile as a house of cards. As Kleiman
observed in 1994, "[c]oupled with severe, or even absolute restric-
tions on the entry of labour, frequent closures can play havoc with
the economic logic underlying the whole agreement."169
167. Levine, supra note 45, at 1406 (noting that the situation "is a classic politi-
calleconomic conundrum").
168. Id. at 1408.
169. Kleiman, supra note 27, at 372.
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The collapse of the Palestinian economic development strategy
has led many to start speculating about the best way to re-cast Pal-
estinian trade law in the final status negotiations. Ussama Dab-
bagh has argued, for example, that Palestinian trade policy should
involve four elements: (1) protection or subsidization of some Pal-
estinian industries; (2) imposition of discriminatory tariffs on Is-
raeli imports; (3) movement towards a customs union with Jordan;
and (4) development of markets for Palestinian products outside
the Middle East.170 The thrust of Dabbagh's recommendations is
separation of the Palestinian Territories from Israel, which is a
theme others have sounded.'
Geographic realities make such a separation virtually impossi-
ble. Further, the Israeli economy is too big and too important in
the MENA region to eliminate it as a part of the Palestinian eco-
nomic development strategy. A more realistic trade strategy
would entail two basic elements. First, the Palestinian Territories
desperately need their own ports of exit and entry not subject to
Israeli security actions or non-tariff barriers. Plans to complete
such facilities in Gaza need dramatic acceleration. Further, in the
permanent status negotiations, the Palestinians need to gain more
control of their borders with Egypt and Jordan so that trade can
flow more easily to and through these countries. In an age where
many pundits and politicians are fervently discussing the develop-
ment of the "borderless world," it seems odd to advocate that in
order to join such a borderless world, the Palestinians need their
own borders. Borders still matter, however, particularly if a nation
does not control any.
Second, the free trade area plus customs union arrangement
needs to be replaced with a straight free trade agreement between
the Palestinians and Israel. This change would allow reciprocal
preferential treatment of imports as exists under the Economic
Protocol but would allow the Palestinians to set their own tariff
rates with the rest of the world. Having the power to establish
tariffs would give the Palestinians more to bargain with when try-
ing to pry open foreign markets. The Palestinians could, thus, so-
lidify the free trade arrangements already concluded with the
United States and with the European Union. Palestinian control
170. Dabbagh, supra note 79, at 16.
171. See, e.g., Shlomo Avineri, Sidestepping Democracy, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 12, 14
(July/Aug. 1994) (advocating that the Palestinians build their economy "with as few links
to Israel as possible").
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over their tariff rates could also allow the Palestinians to be a
voice for more trade liberalization in the MENA region. Israeli
concerns about the Palestinian Territories becoming a conduit for
cheap goods into Israel would have to be dealt with through spe-
cific rules of origin in the free trade agreement, perhaps modeled
on the rules of origin in the U.S.-Israel FTA.
If the final status negotiations produce a Palestinian entity with
international legal status, then a further element of a re-cast Pales-
tinian trade policy would be membership in the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"). The WTO would impose healthy disciplines
on Palestinian trade law that would keep it firmly on the liberal,
market-oriented path Palestinian leaders claim they want to walk.
It would also give the Palestinians a seat at the global trading table
like every other sovereign nation.
In essence, my proposal advocates dismantling the hybrid free-
trade area/customs union created in the Economic Protocol.
While the customs union model clearly dominates the Economic
Protocol, the free trade area model takes precedence in my pro-
posal. The free trade model requires, of course, that borders be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian Territories exist. Fixed borders
are, of course, consistent with the goals of the permanent status
negotiations in which the controversy concerns where to fix bor-
ders rather than whether to fix them. At issue too in the negotia-
tions will be the border powers of the Palestinian Authority. My
proposal advocates that these powers at least ought to include cus-
toms authority sufficient to operate a free trade area with Israel-
collecting duties and verifying compliance with rules of origin, etc.
I realize that my recommendations rest on an assumption of
peace, just like the economic strategy developed by the leaders
who crafted the peace process and the Oslo framework for imple-
menting the economic development strategy. Events during the
life of the peace process have treated this assumption cruelly. Al-
though Secretary of State Albright's intervention may have halted
the peace process' free fall following the September 1997 suicide
bombing in Jerusalem, it still remains to be seen whether the
peace process will recover any of the ground lost in recent years.
The hostility that has grown between Israel and the Palestinians
and the manifest failures of the Palestinian Authority on economic
and political issues perhaps make it look rather foolish to continue
.holding the assumption of peace. But this assumption is also a
faith in humanity that history may treat roughly but can never ex-
tinguish. My analysis of Palestinian trade law and my argument
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for a change in the arrangement established in the Economic Pro-
tocol assumes that the peace process will survive in some form be-
cause neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians want to return to the
torments of the occupation. In analyzing Palestinian trade law, I
walk, however feebly, down the path less traveled in the Middle
East. Perhaps continuing to choose this path will one day make all
the difference.
